Understanding, not Knowing, as the Core of Polanyi’s Philosophy

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Abstract: Although Michael Polanyi’s magnum opus is entitled Personal Knowledge, I argue that “understanding” more adequately describes Polanyi’s many-layered epistemic vision than knowledge or even knowing. Knowledge suggests the achieved certainty and objectivity that science is alleged to provide. Such an emphasis on knowledge thereby devalues the personally understood traditions and personal goals that make life worth living. Understanding more comprehensively acknowledges the way humans live and cope. It is grounded in tacit functions we share with other animals, but through language it helps one gain a sense of control over what one intends, means, and does. It includes an interpersonal, appreciative aspect largely missing in knowing. In sum, understanding functions as the experiential base upon which healthy social relations, truthful claims, and personal responsibility rests.

Key words: intention, knowledge, language, meaning, Michael Polanyi, schemas, understanding.

It has been suggested that, although the title of Michael Polanyi’s 

*magnum opus* is *Personal Knowledge*, it would be more consistent with the dynamic thrust of his philosophical vision if the work were entitled *Personal Knowing*. In this essay, I will argue that an even more apt title to describe his philosophy than *Personal Knowing* would be *A Philosophy of Understanding*. For Polanyi, reaching the state of understanding involves tacit acts of discerning, creating, and evaluating meanings of various sorts. This

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45 Polanyi himself recognizes this point. “Knowledge is an activity which would be better described as a process of knowing” (KB 132).
essay’s aim is not only to draw out important implications of Polanyi’s thought, but also to demonstrate how understanding, in its sensitivity to several types of meaning, provides epistemology with a more comprehensive, more adequate account than is offered by the traditional focus on knowing and knowledge.

Note first and primarily that the term “knowledge” often is used in society to designate either what has been demonstrated logically or scientifically or, more colloquially, what is commonly taken for granted. It manifests an aura of objectivity. “Understanding,” on the other hand, is grounded in an embodied capacity of an individual to learn from experience. Understanding tends to be rooted in concepts, knowledge tends to trade in language. Understanding can accommodate reasoning about a person’s world orientation and values, topics about which knowledge cannot legitimately make claims. Understanding encompasses elusive psychological factors like motivation, desire, and strategy, factors that seem outside the realm of knowing. Polanyi codifies his insight into how understanding encapsulates one’s personal experience and the shaping influence of environment by speaking of a person’s calling. Polanyi came to see his own calling to be developing a rich, meaning-laden theory of understanding designed to heal the twentieth century’s massive problems and to offer individuals hope that their lives matter.

46 During his April 25, 1967 interview with Ray Wilken, Polanyi suggests understanding is a tacit ability to make sense of the world. He indicates that this capacity has allowed him to lessen his earlier emphasis on justifying our ultimate commitments and instead attend to the tacit processes shaping human consciousness (see also his comments at PK, xi). I thank Phil Mullins for suggesting the Wilken comments and for his thoughtful comments on this essay.

47 The claim that Polanyi’s thought is designed to heal the sick modern mind and its associated social problems is convincingly argued by Harry Prosch in his book, Michael Polanyi: A Critical Exposition (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1986).
Additionally, understanding includes an interpersonal, appreciative aspect largely missing in knowing. This interpersonal aspect of understanding supports Polanyi’s view that we are embedded in and shaped by our cultural milieu. We are social animals who seek to belong, who value conviviality. Understanding has a social as well as an individual character. Understanding, like knowing, can refer to comprehension of material at a given epistemic level, but more than knowledge, it is nimble and able to comprehend the relationships between materials at different epistemic levels. Similarly, it can assess and comprehend with sensitivity the diverse views of different people. Understanding is the launching site for synoptic interpretation. Using an understanding of diverse factors, an imaginative integration can produce comprehensive vision.

Finally, the notion of understanding provides unity to the various reaches of Polanyi’s thought—unity that is derived from vision more than knowledge. His pre-philosophical attention to matters of reconstituting liberal politics and economics involves understanding such things as human motivations and envisioning the outcomes of different social systems in their relation to encouraging justice and peace. The outcome of his thinking about such matters is one theory among many. While based on understanding, his social thought, like his philosophy, is subject to contentious discussion; it is not a matter of knowledge.

In short, understanding is both more sensitive to diversity and more comprehensive than knowing. It draws strength and direction from tacit processes in a way that nurtures significant explicit thought and action. It functions at the very core of Polanyi’s philosophical venture.

Well, since understanding is so importantly involved in living, then its nature and functioning ought to be examined closely. That is my aim in this essay.
Polanviana 2017 (26) 1-2.

1. Situating Understanding

In suggesting the importance of “understanding” for comprehending Polanyian thought, I am of course not imposing some concept that is foreign to his philosophical vision. Indeed, in *The Study of Man*, Polanyi’s summary statement of what he thinks he achieved in *Personal Knowledge*, Polanyi states that the one word to identify properly all the processes by which humans gain intellectual control over their experience is “understanding” (SM 20; see also PK 132). Control is achieved through tacitly reorganizing experiences into intelligible and manipulable schemas and categories. Understanding includes all the tacit processes and powers through which persons come to recognize what they believe or accept, and such examination comes to serve as the ultimate basis for justifying what they think and how they act. Understanding thus anchors Polanyi’s fiduciary philosophy. It is the grounding source of competence and claims of knowledge. On this basis, Polanyi states, “I have now expanded the function of understanding into that of knowing what we intend, what we mean, or what we do” (SM 22). Now if understanding is about personal control of thought and action and is therefore even more firmly grounded in the personal than knowing, perhaps Polanyi should have phrased the sentence just quoted to eliminate the “knowing” of what we intend, etc. It might better be stated as follows: “I have now expanded the function of understanding into that of being personally in control of what we intend, what we mean, and what we do.” This way of phrasing things aptly demonstrates that the core of personal responsibility lies in judgments expressive of our understanding and its galaxy of beliefs.48

48 In a perceptive article describing Polanyi’s theory of judgment, Diane Yeager notes that for Polanyi the “act (and art) of personal judgment is, in fact, the core of his distinctive conception of the nature of knowing. . .” (Yeager, “The Deliberate Holding of Unproven Beliefs,” *The Political Science Reviewer* XXXVII [2008], 101). She further observes that Polanyi considers “judgment to be an indelible power constitutive of personhood” (106).
Why doesn’t Polanyi make the greater importance of understanding than knowing clearer in how he labels his thought if it is so central to his philosophical position? The certainty associated with knowing links it with the aim of Cartesian philosophy. Descartes sought to establish a methodology that would transcend the subjective uncertainty he discerned in his Jesuit education. Polanyi experienced the problematic legacy of Descartes’s methodology in the Marxism, positivism, and objectivism that was widely accepted in the first half of the twentieth century. Polanyi labels his effective discrediting of those philosophical positions with the terms “personal knowledge” and “post-critical philosophy.” He uses these two terms to demonstrate that he offers an epistemological alternative. Unfortunately, each term also bears connotations that are at odds with his broad intent. “Personal philosophy” sounds to the uninitiated to advocate a strictly subjective approach to philosophy, even though Polanyi goes to great lengths to disavow any such interpretation. “Post-critical philosophy” has the problem that the term “post-critical” suggests criticism no longer has a place in philosophy, which again is not what Polanyi believes.

Does the term “personal understanding” more adequately capture the essence of Polanyi’s unique vision? Unfortunately, I don’t think so. Understanding is generally thought to have a personal element, so the term does not hint at the wholesale shift from modernist presuppositions that Polanyi’s comprehensive thought requires. Rather “personal understanding” tends to sound like a retreat into flaccid subjectivism. “Personal knowledge” more paradoxically and evocatively integrates a term that sounds subjective with a term that sounds objective, and this invites inquiry into the nature of this integration. “Post-critical philosophy” also lures one into seeking out

Judgment for Polanyi occurs at different levels, but perhaps it is most strikingly manifest in transforming tacit sensitivity into articulate expression. This act is most conducive to truth when it emerges under the guidance of understanding.
what Polanyi’s intended position might be. Since I believe understanding is at the very center of that intention, my candidate to describe most accurately Polanyi’s epistemic prioritizing of understanding would simply be “philosophy of understanding.” I am not advocating “philosophy of understanding” replace “post-critical philosophy” or “personal knowledge;” I only suggest it is the phrase that most adequately describes his philosophical stance.

His discussion in *The Study of Man* indicates that Polanyi intends the term “understanding” to cover processes at several levels, including those he calls “tacit knowing.” He roots “understanding” in innate and learned *inarticulate skills* and the nonlinguistic lessons we learn from our skillful perceptual interactions with our environments. “We may say in general that by acquiring a skill, whether muscular or intellectual, we achieve an understanding which we cannot put into words and which is continuous with the inarticulate faculties of animals” (PK 90). All skill-based transactions within and between living organisms are purposeful and are therefore triadic (A interacts with B to achieve resulting purpose C) rather than dualistic (merely mechanistic) in nature. Biosemiotics describes the various sorts of triadic processes making understanding possible insofar as these embodied activities transpire at levels chemists and biologists study. In controlling what we intend, mean, and do, the processes of understanding operate at levels psychology is best equipped to study. However, perhaps it is philosophy that ideally assumes the *systemic perspective* that can best interpret understanding as a complex phenomenon operating on many interrelated levels.

This essay interprets understanding primarily from a systemic perspective. Because some aspects of understanding are tacit, yet at another level of consciousness we are aware that we understand something, an examination of the interdependent layers of consciousness seems a promising avenue of approach to the systemic vision we seek.
Polanyi anchors his discussion of the emergence of human consciousness by speaking of the “from-to” character of consciousness. In adding a “from” dimension to the “to” aspect of consciousness emphasized by Brentano, Polanyi made an important step. Brentano stated that all consciousness is of some object or content, the “to.” Polanyi’s “from” indicates the complex, largely tacit background that gives the object or content of the “to” specific meaning. He uses the example of a finger pointing to an object as showing that two kinds of awareness are involved in establishing a speaker’s intent: the subsidiary finger and the focal object that is meant by pointing (see KB 181-182). Here Polanyi simplifies the complexity of the “from” and concentrates on how a subsidiary of which we are aware contributes to focal meaning (the “to”). However, passages such as the following indicate Polanyi fully recognizes that complex background features are included in the functioning of the “from.” Our acts of knowing, he says, rely on “stimuli coming from outside, from all parts of our body and from tools or instruments assimilated to our body, and . . . on a wide range of linguistic pointers which bring to bear our pre-conceptions—based on past experiences—on the interpretation of our subject matter” (KB 134).

To highlight the way the inarticulate and articulate levels of consciousness are connected through and dependent upon language in ordinary human experience, for many years I have advocated expanding Polanyi’s from-to model of consciousness into a triadic from-via-to model. This model is more consistent with Polanyi’s triadic formulation of consciousness (see KB 181-182) than his “from-to model,” which suggests duality. I have stipulated that the “via” which transforms the tacit “from” into the articulate “to” be restricted to discursive symbolism—to language in particular—as the unique contributor to human consciousness.49 It is

49 I recognize that at many levels of physiological functioning triadic mediation occurs, so that the notion of a “via” could be applied more generally than with respect to linguistic usage.
important to recognize that language is not simply restricted to mental processing in speech and thought, but that it may also be applied to sensation to create the level of perception that accommodates question raising and thoughtful inquiry. That is, perception becomes distinctively human when language is added to the schematized recognition of sensation so that a person can reflect upon and discuss what is perceived. More basically, I see the background-judging, framework-assembling, word-evoking, and language-using carried out at the “via” level to be one of two central components of personhood, involved in constituting the responsible individual. The second component, to be discussed later in this article, is meaning. Each component relies upon understanding.

Now the tripartite epistemic structure of human understanding has been laid out. Its processes involve a tacit background, linguistic interpretation, and resultant meaning. Let us further explore each of these aspects of understanding in order.

2. The Inarticulate Roots of Understanding

In an intriguing footnote, Polanyi elaborates on several of the tacit aspects of understanding he sees it to encompass:

Our widened use of the word ‘understanding’ makes it comprise the domain of ‘conception’ as well as that of ‘schema’, the term used by Claparede and Piaget for designating a complex motoric faculty. I shall use these words interchangeably, to stand for a kind of latent knowledge, or aspects of such knowledge, as distinct from any overt

But to highlight the distinctive form of consciousness with which language usage blesses humans, I restrict the term “via” to the various ways language (discursive symbolism) shapes human thought and behavior.
performances based on this kind of knowledge. Later on ‘intuition’ or ‘insight’ will be introduced to describe the act of understanding, particularly in mathematics. (PK 91)

Polanyi’s act of embedding inarticulate understanding in both the schemas of sensorimotor skills and sensory conception makes sense in terms of recent understanding of brain architecture. These skills are closely linked in the cerebral cortex. In addition, linguistic ability seems to have evolved as an elaboration of motoric skills in the same region of the brain. This makes sense in that talking involves skillfully moving lips, tongue, and vocal chords. Perhaps this tight connection indicates why we often cannot resist accompanying our speech with hand and body gestures. The use of language is a thoroughly embodied phenomenon.

Polanyi identifies three types of inarticulate intelligence employed by nonhuman animals: trick, sign and latent learning (PK 71-76). These involve respectively a skill in contriving things for certain purposes, observing signals that inform animals of environmental events of interest and potential response, and the reorganization of what is experienced into meaningfully connected memories, mental maps that can be utilized in purposeful behavior. Polanyi states that latent learning, the crucial third type of inarticulate intelligence, occurs “when the process of reorganization is achieved not by a particular act of contriving or observing, but by achieving a true understanding of a situation which had been open to inspection almost entirely from the start” (PK 74). Thus, latent learning stores the lessons of experience and functions as the ground of understanding.

Polanyi describes the realm of inarticulate understanding as constituting an ineffable domain, by which he means that while one can refer to its inarticulate contents, one cannot speak of them adequately (PK 91). “This ineffable domain of skillful knowing is continuous in its inarticulateness
with the knowledge possessed by animals and infants, who, as we have seen, also possess the capacity for reorganizing their inarticulate knowledge and using it as an interpretive framework” (PK 90).  

It is evident that the three inarticulate types of learning are not totally unconscious, even though like all mental processes they depend upon unconscious processes. They rely upon an awareness of the world that is intelligent but not linguistic in character. Our awareness of the pointing finger is of this character. Indeed, much of the perception humans experience—all that is not at the center of attention—is of this inarticulate character. The fact that much that is tacit is simultaneously conscious distinguishes the tacit from the unconscious in Freudian and other psychological usage. I will put off exploring the tacit aspect of perception until the subsequent section.

To summarize: Understanding connotes an ability to discern relationships that help one see the big picture and feel in control. One is able to find one’s way about. The inarticulate aspect of understanding refers to mental processes in which any of the three types of inarticulate intelligence humans share with other animals are utilized in accordance with some purpose. I view latent learning as a particularly significant aspect of inarticulate understanding, because embedding learning in a map-like...

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50 Polanyi’s emphasis on the inarticulate abilities we share with other animals is not an anomalous vision in conflict with contemporary understanding. Michael Tomasello, the influential co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, writes (in harmony with Polanyi’s view) that “great apes, as the closest living relatives of humans, already understand in human-like ways many aspects of their physical and social worlds, including the causal and intentional relations that structure those worlds. This means that many important aspects of human understanding derive not from humans’ unique forms of sociality, culture, and language but rather, from something like the individual problem-solving abilities of great apes in general” (A Natural History of Human Thinking [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014], 2).
structure allows one to be aware of how one’s experiences fit together coherently. This in turn provides the basis for intelligent behavior.

3. The Role of Perception in Understanding

If we make intelligent distinctions when perceiving the world even though we are not making use of language, on what basis are these distinctions made? Through indwelt schemas stored in memory.

Our receptors provide the basic pre-linguistic data of perception. Environmental information seized by receptors is then conveyed as sensation by the central nervous system to a processing center, usually the brain. We are thereby bathed in a steady stream of sensation, most of which is ignored. Attention tends to be directed to that sensory material that is novel and needing to be controlled, to data of pre-existing interest, to that which satisfies desires, or to that which is viewed as threatening. Sensation tied to the routine, the already organized, is generally ignored. A person living next to railroad tracks soon ceases hearing trains rumbling past, even though the sound undoubtedly is processed aurally. That which is well understood is far less interesting than seeking to understand the mysterious, the uncertain, or the unusual.

After it is initially experienced, sensation continues to be present for a brief period as input from the real world calling for interpretation and response. The following list describes increasingly rich response to sensation: 1) sensation that never comes to awareness, 2) peripheral and background awareness that is not focused upon, 3) sensation that is schematized and consequently subject to recognition and response, and 4) schematized perception to which language serves as a focusing agent. We control interpretation of the sensation, but the independent character of what is sensed controls the adequacy of our interpretation. Throughout each of these four
levels of increased attention to sensation, the sense data itself is not altered. Rather the degree of attention to the data becomes more intense and more subject to intellectual manipulation and regulation.

How does schematization occur? Mental existence is based on the innate cognitive ability to *abstract* patterns from sensory experience. Susanne Langer describes abstraction as “the tendency to single out the salient features of experience that recur on different occasions or occur simultaneously in multiple instances, and to remember those features and recognize them as the same in each case.”51 Those remembered, repeated patterns are what I term “schemas.” I distinguish two tacitly formed types of schemas: pre-linguistic percepts based on patterns derived from sensation, and pre-linguistic concepts coagulated out from recalled repeated relationships and patterns occurring in experience. Some of these recognized patterns are so basic to intelligibility, like cause and effect or substance, that Kant regarded them as a priori categories. The abstracting act of schematizing sensation is the original act of understanding; the act of recognition based on previous schematization is a higher-level act of understanding. The activity of latent learning in categorizing and organizing recognized schemas is a yet higher-level but still pre-linguistic act of understanding.

Since most aspects of ordinary experience are repeated, one tends to dwell in a taken-for-granted perceptual world needing no linguistic attention. The schematized world attended to without linguistic attention is phenomenologically similar to the world in which non-human animals and human infants dwell. It is a world of primary understanding making use of original schematization, subsequent recognition, and latent learning. Within the holism of unitary consciousness, we humans tend not to notice the difference between the several simultaneous levels in which we often dwell. For instance, when we engage in a conversation while driving a car, we are

attentive in at least two levels of perception: we tacitly attend to the road and other cars while we explicitly (linguistically) attend to what our friend is saying within the course of a conversation. The adequacy of such tacit attention to driving is based on schemas—in tel eg c tually informed habits. To be sure, at some point in the past we learned how to drive a car through linguistic instruction, but over time driving became a habitual activity. Repeated actions, whether guided by language or not, tend to become routinized in schemas so that they can be performed without undue mental effort or linguistic attention. When these actions are integrated so as to perform regular chores, they become customs or skills that once learned need no higher-level attention. They can be utilized in scenarios of multi-tasking, as in talking while driving. They become second nature. Much of our time is spent cruising along in culturally saturated, habitual patterns of activity.

Schemas, it should now be evident, play a crucial role in constructing perceptual understanding. At the simplest level, they are interiorized spatial patterns (Peircean signs) that allow for visual recognition. Indeed, they underlie recognitions of many types—of the taste of cinnamon, of the aroma of Chanel No. 5, of the feel of leather, of the sound of an oboe. Thus schemas have a kinesthetic character not tied to any specific sense, although we seem most dependent on vision. Schemas can guide temporal activity as well as imprint spatial structure. Mark Johnson states that they exist “in a continuous, analog fashion in our understanding.” He notes further that schematic structures “are constantly operating in our perception, bodily movement through space, and physical manipulation of objects.”

Habits are themselves often rather complex schemas in which we dwell. Concepts are intellectual schemas to which words are typically attached.

The world of primary understanding based on schemas apparently served in evolutionary history as a breeding ground for conception freed from dependence on environmental signals. At some fairly advanced stage of animal development, the patterns identified in schematic recognition apparently became loosened from their attachment to empirical reality. Visual schemas then become the free-floating images of dream and fantasy. Moreover, the dynamic schemas underlying habits, cause-and-effect patterns, and other processes can also become detached from their original sites. The combination of free-floating spatial and temporal schemas melded with the drive to be pro-active can be plausibly conceived as the origin of imagination. Schemas released from attachment to empirical immediacy give birth to conception. Imagination bubbles up and flies beyond the limits imposed by given sensation. Imagination shaped by memory may represent features previously encountered in the world or can create entirely novel concoctions. The products of imagination may flit away as fantasies, they may inspire artistic expression, or they may help orchestrate technological innovations—the contrivances engendered by trick learning Polanyi mentions. Just as words properly placed in a proposition contribute to a higher level of meaning, so images of all sorts—aural as well as visual—can contribute not only to expanded consciousness, but also to invention and discovery.

Many of the skillful competencies humans share with other animals, particularly primates, are made possible through augmenting primary understanding with imagination. The apes exhibit an ability to cope with what life brings; they can plan and play, meet and mate. It is not necessary to relegate such traits of consciousness as intention and meaning to linguistic ability alone. Included within the tacit dimension are the embodied skills Polanyi mentions, such as reading the information provided by a probe, or operating a machine. Indeed, many of the operations humans learn become.
second nature and do not require language-loaded thought in order to function properly.

Perception takes on its uniquely human form when words, phrases, or sentences interpret it. Often specific concepts, words, or phrases are habitually attached to the complexity of sensation. Then the danger exists that the empirical world becomes restrictively categorized in thought and the particularity of things is ignored. A depleted type of understanding emerges. Nevertheless, the linguistic interpretation of what we perceive allows for the unique power of reflection tied to imagination and intuition to be released. Imagistic meaning is particularly sensitive to aesthetic standards like harmony, beauty, balance, and coherence. Polanyi claims that at heart science is a form of augmented perception (“Creative Imagination” in SEP, 252). Scientific discovery in his recounting follows felt anticipations of increasing imagistic consolidation and beauty to a climax in intuition of coherent solution. Thus, discovery ranks as a culminating form of imagistic meaning—of a form of understanding based on perceptual insight. The climax in intuition is to experience coherence accompanied by feelings of satisfaction to which we shall return shortly. At this point, however, explicit attention to the fecundity inherent in language is needed to address still higher degrees of understanding.

4. The Articulation of Understanding through Language

Language is, of course, the primary factor that produces the uniquely human form of articulate understanding. Polanyi suggests that the three tacit powers of the mind described earlier are combined in humans, unlike other animals, to enable us to speak. “To speak is to contrive signs, to observe their fitness, and to interpret their alternative relations; though the animal possesses each of these three faculties, he cannot combine them” (PK 82). While Polanyi theoretically emphasizes the importance of language in human
Polanyi seeks to interpret how humans negotiate several types of understanding to which we are privy by telling of how a traveler writes to a reader of his experiences so that the reader may imaginatively enter into the experience. Polanyi says the communication that follows involves a sequence of three integrations.

The first is an intelligent understanding of sights and events, the second the composing of a verbal account of this experience, and the third the interpretation of this verbal account with a view to reproducing this experience which is reported. . .The first triad is more a sense-reading, the second more a sense-giving and the third, once more, a sense-reading. ((KB 186)

He calls the basic schematizing of sensory experience “sense-reading.” When that schematized sensory experience is translated into language, he terms this act “sense-giving.” If another person reads what the perceiver writes, this again requires sense-reading. But note that Polanyi uses the same term, “sense-reading,” to refer to activity at two different levels: one at the level of understanding what one sees and the other at the level of comprehending
human language. This can be confusing, for different processes of understanding occur at the inarticulate and articulate levels of consciousness.

I list below some of the interrelated characteristics of language—the “via”—that jointly contribute to a state of human consciousness not found in other animals. Inasmuch as the articulate level of understanding is dependent on language, increased understanding of the nature and processes of language increases our understanding of understanding itself.

1. Human language, unlike other forms of communication, has a vocabulary. Words, the elements of language, are arbitrarily rather than iconically related to what they denote. Their relatively fixed meanings are established by convention. As conventional, language is socially constituted and forms the basis for intersubjective communication, yet as schematically grounded in personal experience, words (and combinational flexibility) allow for personal creativity. Words singly and in combination also exhibit connotations reflective of the speaker’s/writer’s intention and the context in which they are used. There are often alternative ways to arrive at the same or similar meanings, some more precise or pleasing than others.

2. Words can be arranged according to syntactical and grammatical rules into propositions or other types of higher-level semantic meaning. “Language as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When we hear our native language we do not hear grammar or particular sounds or meanings, we hear and instantly understand what is being said as a whole, individually and together in a conversation or story.”53 That is, when we speak or write, we

create an emergent level of consciousness that is more than a mere aggregation of words. Individual words name items or events and can then function as signals. Words in proper syntactic combination, however, make possible claims of truth or falsity and help establish the whole edifice of human culture.

3. Some words or phrases are intelligibly equivalent to the meaning of other groups of words so that dictionaries can be constructed. Languages then are domesticated and allow for precision in communication.

4. Words tend to be linked to particular schemas which in turn capture commonly available objects or events. Many of these same intellectual schemas (concepts) are referred to in different languages. Lakoff and Johnson persuasively argue that this is because all languages are grounded in bodily accessible basic-level categories that are neither too abstract nor too refined.54 Thus, one can equally call a horse a caballo, a pferd, or a cheval. That humans throughout the world share many of the same or very similar concepts provides a basis upon which translations from one language to another can be established.

5. As social animals, young humans are predisposed to learn languages (and other aspects of our cultural heritage) as part of

54 See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 26-30. Elizabeth Spelke’s findings over two decades suggests that infants prior to six months old are able to single out objects “that are internally cohesive and separately movable: cups but not . . . doorknobs, sand piles, or block towers” (in Michael Tomasello, *Why We Cooperate*, [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009], 158). She states (156-157) that there is evidence for at least five systems of core knowledge prior to the learning of language. A baby’s ability to recognize and reason about such things as material objects, intentional agents, and situated places offers support for the significance of Polanyi’s notion of latent learning.
their initiation into social reality. Parents shape the baby’s babbling into language and new levels of intimacy and competence result. The young child’s world expands beyond immediate perceptual experience though the imaginative reach of language (sometimes called displacement).

6. Language has great plasticity. It can be shaped into different and often nested frameworks of understanding so that the natural, cultural, and interpersonal worlds can be engaged from different perspectives. The most general sorts of frameworks mold specific cultural understandings of what makes sense (for instance, the Azande versus the scientific worldview). Collingwood calls such basic beliefs “absolute presuppositions” and suggests many inhabitants of a culture are not even aware of these beliefs and their influence. The various academic disciplines all tend to have specific frameworks that may separate them to some degree from other disciplines, although usually not with the incommensurability that Kuhn is often interpreted as suggesting. Then there are the very personal frameworks individuals develop. The different roles people play and the different personalities they engage each tend to induce the use of specific vocabularies that function as frameworks. Frameworks tend to be labile, changing as culture evolves.

7. Jerome Bruner distinguishes two basic modes of linguistic organization that dominate the human urge for explanation: analysis (breaking a whole into its parts to understand better how it works) and narrative exposition (story telling within which causal explanation is frequently embedded). Charles Taylor offers a

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55 Jerome Bruner’s Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) provides a sustained argument for the primacy of these two modes.
related distinction: those in the empiricist tradition like Locke view language as a tool for description and the communication of information, while those in the romantic tradition like Goethe employ the constitutive function of narratives to build novel “landscapes of meaning.”

8. Language, when married with a predisposition to contrive, has produced technological achievements that vastly expand human perception and empirical understanding into macro, micro, and ancient worlds that are unimaginable to other animals. The flexibility of language grants access to different levels and perspectives upon reality, thereby dramatically expanding the reach of understanding.

9. The most important technological achievement, writing, now augmented by the internet, has allowed for unprecedented shared communication across ethnic and generational divisions. This expanded intelligible world becomes part of the cultural legacy into which humans are socialized and which thereby shapes human experience. A kind of global orthodoxy supported by the media and involving science, history, and the various facets of globalization has thereby challenged the authority of local traditions. Shared understanding has consequently become potentially more widespread, although in practice electronic media have also spawned new forms of tribalism.

Three aspects of language not mentioned above are significant with respect to understanding. First, primary understanding, as pre-linguistic, is clearly tacit in its functioning. But so is the process of articulate understanding. In expressing ourselves linguistically, most of our focal attention is neither directed at the words we use nor at the understanding that we feel, but rather at the meanings the words express in fragmentary form or most explicitly as propositions. This is the explicit meaning “to” which we attend. Language is translucent. Understanding is felt. In use, each is tacitly, not focally, experienced. We live in meanings.

Second, I believe much discussion of language is snared in a kind of objectivism that can be just as pernicious as objectivism in science. Words are often treated as reducible to dictionary definitions, and sentences are treated as if their meaning is factually evident to everyone. But in practice, language is a tool used to communicate a speaker’s intention(s), which resting on the various subsidiaries and feelings of individualized experience, are often not clearly related to the conventional meaning of words. The words used by a speaker may have intended connotations slightly different than the meanings expressed in a dictionary definition. Understanding, more than knowing, is attuned to motivation, intention, and the slipperiness of language. Knowledge desires clarity and certainty in all situations, even those where none may be possible. Understanding can accommodate some degree of ambiguity. In their commitment to clarity of discourse, thinkers in the analytic tradition cannot deal effectively with the messiness of much human interchange. Understanding is not chained to fact or linguistic precision the way knowledge is usually taken to be.

Third, another characteristic of language not stressed in the nine points above is that the human need to impose language on experience is virtually irrepresible. It takes trained sensitivity to penetrate in introspection beyond
the incessant babble of language to attend to the variety of feelings that constitute important inarticulate processes. Primary understanding is the term I have used to describe both the process and result of the harmonious encoding and situating of sensed material within long-term memory and embodied skills. Articulate understanding often is stimulated by “the unreasoned conclusions of our senses” (SM 17), but in reflection and imagination, thought soars beyond the limits inherent to the information received from receptors. Some language is far distanced from perceived reality or entirely separate from it. In poetry and fiction, for instance, as Charles Taylor has stressed, language can create new, often artistic, meanings that have no direct relation to the empirical realm. Polanyi and Prosch in *Meaning* explore ways in which linguistic meanings can both extend understanding beyond knowledge but also transcend understanding in imaginative vision and artistic creativity.

5. Meaning

The distinction I have drawn between inarticulate and articulate understanding suggests there exists within human consciousness a fundamental dichotomy. However, rarely is extreme disjunction justified when one takes, as Polanyi does, an evolutionary view regarding biological development and relationship. No doubt there have been in evolutionary history many small incremental steps between the inarticulate understanding of primates and the articulate understanding of humans that reveal underlying continuities as well as emergent discontinuities. From a phenomenological standpoint, understanding seems a felt condition happily including both inarticulate and articulate factors. At this point, I find it instructive to focus on the felt continuities by asking what the function of understanding at any of its levels might be. Here is an introductory answer: *understanding identifies,*
classifies, and assesses the significance of the challenges and opportunities afforded by one’s personal, cultural, and physical environments.

The currency in terms of which understanding identifies, classifies, and assesses is meaning. Previous sections have explored the “from” and the “via.” Now it is time to attend to the “to,” the domain of meant objects—things, thoughts, events, conditions. Caution is required here. For meaning has to do with purposes, relationships and values of embodied content or action as projected or interpreted by persons; it is not properly seen as inherent in objects or qualities. The internal meaning-creating relationship always involves the “from” and the “to” of lower levels of meaning and often the full “from-via-to” of human consciousness. Here I find it necessary to depart from the account of meaning Polanyi gives in Personal Knowledge.

First, he claims there are two kinds of meaning: representative (or denotative) meaning and existential meaning. “We may describe the kind of meaning which a context possesses in itself as existential, to distinguish it especially from denotative or, more generally, representative meaning” (PK 58). I do not believe that this two-fold categorization fully captures the richness of meaning. Does any context possess meaning? In the next section, I will argue that Polanyi’s notion of existential meaning is problematic and offer a substitute version. There also seems to be meaning that is neither contextual nor representative in nature. For instance, biological functions are meaningful but not referential in any obvious sense.

Second, I reject Polanyi’s overgeneralization of gestalt thought. He claims that there are two kinds of content in all meaningful matters. “There are things in it that have a meaning and these things bear on something else, namely on that which is their meaning.”57 This claim makes sense with

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respect to ordinary discourse. Words have conventional meanings and are deployed in a sentence to bear on what is their joint meaning. But should such a relationship be generalized to characterize all meaning, even perception? This is what Polanyi seems to attempt. “[I]n a gestalt the parts have a meaning and the whole which they form is their meaning.”58 I do not believe the parts making up a gestalt typically have a meaning in the same sense that words have a meaning in a sentence. Imagine a picture of a mountain. What is it that creates our understanding that we are viewing a mountain? Is it an integration of the individual streaks of grey, presumably indicating rocks, with the blobs of green that must be trees? No. It is the upward jutting or rounded form that signifies the shape of a mountain. Identifiable mountains have a certain schematized pattern that enables us to identify them as such. To be sure, the context of the silhouette matters in the identification of the upward thrust as a mountain. Without such background illustrated entities as sky, rock, snow, distant trees, etc. providing a context, an upward form could be an iceberg or the graph of a company’s earnings. The useful notion to use in this case, which does come from gestalt thought, is the figure-ground relation, not integration. Using the from-via-to structure, I would describe the perception of the mountain along these lines: with the tacit intent to comprehend what I am viewing, I would recognize in the visual sensations received a familiar schematized pattern of rocky upheaval illustrated against an appropriate background (the “from”) to which the word “mountain” (the “via”) is conventionally attached and understand I am seeing a mountain (the “to”) as the explicit meaning of what I am viewing. The mountain, then, is a gestalt in the sense of fitting a foregrounded general pattern, a perceptual schema, not a gestalt formed by an integration of parts. Schematic pattern, appropriate background, and language, rather than integration of parts and whole, seem best suited for understanding what we perceive visually.

58 Ibid.
On the other hand, music and language are examples of mereological structures unfolding in time. Notes function as parts of a melody; words form parts of a proposition. Understanding a comprehensive entity in such cases involves seeing how parts arranged together in proper order form a whole.

How is meaning best seen as resident within the structure and processes of understanding previously discussed? Clearly, if what we thought about or how we acted had no meaning, we would also have no understanding. Understanding and meaning are woven together in diverse ways. The inarticulate reading of environmental signs signaling danger or opportunity may be regarded as the primal origin of meaningfulness within evolutionary history. “As far down the scale of life as the worms and even perhaps the amoeba, we meet a general alertness of animals, not directed toward any specific satisfaction, but merely exploring what is there; an urge to achieve intellectual control over the situations confronting it” (PK 132). Various physiological processes including respiration and digestion provide the energy that makes understanding and meaning possible.

Most fundamentally, meaning is found wherever purposeful functioning occurs. Just as the human appendix serves no discernible physiological purpose, some twitches and other behaviors serve no discernible purpose and can be said to be meaningless. Meaning shows up in biological functioning as related to the purpose of survival, but since the focus of this essay is on understanding, I will not discuss meaning in the biological realm. Rather I will discriminate types of meaning as they manifest purposefulness and intention through tacit and explicit cognition. A person treats a percept, concept or linguistic element as meaningful when it reveals or illuminates some object—a thing, condition or event. Langer\(^59\) distinguishes between two

\(^59\) My interpretation of Polanyi’s epistemology has long been colored by my use of Susanne Langer’s account of meaning, especially her description of signals and symbols as described in *Philosophy in a New Key*, third ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). See
types of revealing or illuminating: signaling when some aspect of reality is pointed out without linguistic mediation, and symboling when a mental element produces conception that may in turn be put to further usage. Signaling and symboling are referential activities. Three facilitators of referential meaning stand out: (1) the pre-linguistic schemas recognized in primary perception, (2) the images produced by imagination, and (3) language and other discursive symbols. The mediating entities creating these types of meaning are, respectively, schemas, images, and words. These function as mediators in triadic relationships, although the terminology of “via” is only applied to language.

The mediators we use and respond to are cultural artifacts that often have agreed upon meanings. Conventional meanings (4) are human constructs that can be employed by humans to have referential meaning. Signals, images, and language are carriers of different sorts of meaning. A bell in high school can signal the end of a class; a smiley face emoji can communicate a mood; the word “waterfall” denotes a certain feature of a landscape. Conventional signals and symbols, then, like their natural counterparts, may function referentially. Each of the just listed four types of meaning involved in recognizing, interpreting, and organizing internally the phenomena of experience contributes in some way to the purposeful behavior of living beings. All meaning-laden activity, from the most primitive autonomic responses to the most sophisticated creativity, bears on whether a living being flourishes or not. Mere meaningful reference, however, cannot account fully for the role of meaning in flourishing.

6. Intended and Existential Meaning

especially Chapter 3.
One aspect that makes the notion of meaning so powerful is that the term implies more than just awareness of content that is referred to. When allied with understanding, it also refers to a process of gaining control over content, control that may issue in action. Thus, when we are misunderstood, we may explain that the hearer did not understand what we mean, that is, what we intend. Imagistic and discursive meaning are grounded in speaker’s intention. Moreover, when we say something is meaningful to us, we may mean it is significant. I believe it is not an accident that these varied meanings are designated by the same term, “meaning.” I think that understanding functions as the basic epistemic process in which all these aspects of meaning have related systemic functions. Polanyi notes this interdependence when he claims that the function of understanding includes intending, meaning, and doing (citing SM 22 again).

Intended meaning (5) and existential meaning (6) are dynamic epistemic forces that contribute to understanding. Intended meaning (5) tacitly underlies but is distinguishable from the explicit meaning expressed in imagistic and discursive meaning. Humans indwell a variety of purposes during their lives. Some are connected to specific roles; some are quite vague personal and social goals. Usually our language usage is tied to mundane immediate goals: I need to call my friend about an upcoming meeting; I want to find the best reasonably priced repair service for the washing machine; I’d like to share my evaluation of a movie. These fleeting examples of (5) intended meaning arise out of dwelling in a rich background understanding of the society and culture in which one dwells. Satisfactions of our purposes often extend or alter our reservoir of background understanding and thereby contribute to new intentions.

We have seen that within rational human experience, language (the “via”) expresses a person’s largely tacit intentions at the “from” level by
formulating explicit meanings at the “to” level. The specific words and phrases required to express the meaning of a rational intention are evoked according to felt associative relationships from memorized vocabulary and inarticulate understanding. Our speech is judged for adequacy by aesthetic criteria: does the meaning expressed harmonize with and appropriately represent the intention and its grounding in latent learning? Does commonly understood explicit meaning adequately match intended tacit meaning? Neither understanding nor communication are complete unless there is an adequate match.

The successful achievement of our goals results in feelings of satisfaction. Failure of achievement results in feelings of frustration or defeat. The little victories and defeats of everyday life do not add up to much, but the more basic goals of living, such as having faithful companions, being recognized as successful in one's career, or creatively expressing oneself in a valued hobby—these do make a difference in how we view life. They relate to whether or not we experience meaning in life. Meaning in this sense has to do with feelings of significance. We are speaking here of (6) existential meaning, the felt assessment of the degree to which we are satisfying our goals, especially those goals we feel to be of greatest significance.

Greater understanding of existential meaning can be gained by returning to Polanyi’s notion that understanding is rooted in embodied skills.

“What I understand in this manner has a meaning for me, and it has this meaning in itself, and not as a sign has a meaning when denoting an object. I have called this earlier on an existential meaning. Since animals have no language which could denote anything, we may describe all meaning of the kind that is understood by animals as existential” (PK 90).
Agreed, a skill does not have denotative meaning. But does it have a meaning in itself? I believe Polanyi’s notion of existential meaning is flawed. As examples of things having existential meaning, he lists a physiognomy, a tune, and a pattern, and he states that “they mean something only in themselves” (PK 58). He goes on, we have seen, to “describe the kind of meaning which a context possesses in itself as existential, to distinguish it especially from denotative or, more generally, representative meaning. . . All kinds of order, whether contrived or natural, have existential meaning; but contrived order usually also conveys a message” (PK 90).

I believe there is a gem of insight in Polanyi’s notion of existential meaning, but that it is obscured by an overlay of several problematic notions. First, does all order have existential meaning? No, I would strongly urge. Order manifests the potential for meaning that is realized only when that order is recognized and employed in relation to some purpose(s) or insight(s) of a living entity. Polanyi speaks of the actualization of that potential for meaning as an achievement. However, he generally does not consider the world of physics and chemistry alone as meaningful, even though aspects of that world are clearly ordered. The process of anthropogenesis he describes in Part IV of Personal Knowing describes life as bringing meaning to an otherwise meaningless universe. “While the first rise of living individuals overcame the meaninglessness of the universe by establishing in it centres of subjective interests, the rise of human thought in its turn overcame these subjective interests by its universal intent” (PK 389). In Polanyi’s comprehensive vision, order in contrast to randomness can serve as a clue for new discovery, but it is not itself meaningful apart from its telic appropriation by living beings.

A similar sort of argument can be used to critique the notion of existential meaning as meaningful only in itself. Does a person’s facial expression, or a tune, or a pattern have the sort of independent contextual meaning Polanyi ascribes to them? No. A person’s expression becomes
meaningful only when it is observed by another person interested in ascertaining the first person’s state of mind. A tune without a listener would just be noise. To be sure, there is an ineliminable contextual aspect to a tune; a single sound is not a tune. At the very least, a potential listener is needed to make a sequence of notes meaningful. Likewise, a pattern takes on meaning only when it is regarded or employed by a person for some purpose. For the world is so replete with relationships that can be seen as patterns that it is otiose to regard all patterns, all order, as meaningful.

What then is the gem associated with Polanyi’s notion of existential meaning? It is the notion that a skill has a “meaning for me.” It deals with something I care about. More primal than linguistic meaning, which has assumed dominance in analytic thought, is inarticulate, embodied purposefulness—felt sorts of meaning that give birth to intentions. Existential meaning (6), as properly conceived, is a felt characteristic of actions related to the success or failure of personally affirmed goals, purposes, or interests. Its existence becomes manifest through the expression of our emotions or our passions. In his language of passions, Polanyi gives examples of what I am here calling existential meaning. Heuristic passion, persuasive passion, the passion for justice—these represent impulses seeking existential satisfactions.

Seeking the intellectual satisfaction associated with securing understanding is an important motive driving human thought and action. This claim is central to the thesis of this essay. Polanyi speaks of the passion to understand as “an urge to achieve intellectual control over the situations confronting” a living being (PK 132). The satisfaction of desires is another motivating objective. Polanyi claims intellectual satisfaction is more significant than desire satisfaction. He states that “while appetites are guided by standards of private satisfaction, a passion for mental excellence believes itself to be fulfilling universal obligations” (PK 174).

In addition, when Polanyi in Meaning describes the importance of
interest and being carried away during the construction of different sorts of meaning, he expresses key aspects of what I mean by existential meaning. He views the act of discovery in science as an exemplary instance of experiencing existential meaning, as Richard Gelwick makes clear in his pioneering treatment of Polanyi’s philosophy.\(^{60}\) The discovery of a significant natural coherence produces understanding accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction. The arts and religion are taken to be especially powerful cultural vehicles for eliciting experiences of existential meaning. For instance, with respect to poetry, he writes that “a metaphor, like a symbol, carries us away, embodies us in itself, and moves us deeply as we surrender ourselves to it” (\(M\) 79).

Language’s unprecedented capacity to envision the future facilitates the rise of anxieties and fears. But language also functions as the major tool that humans use to alleviate those anxieties and secure existential meaning. The great cultural constructions of language—religions, for instance—offer practices or formulas to counter the anxieties and dilemmas blocking people’s experiences of positive existential meaning. Rhetoric is another way language is deployed in search of existential meaning. As Polanyi notes, “language is primarily and always interpersonal and in some degree impassioned; exclusively so in emotional expression (passionate communication) and imperative speech (action by speech), while even in declaratory statements of fact there is some purpose (to communicate) and passion (to express belief)” (PK 77).”

For Polanyi, understanding as a state of being is but a term to describe the accumulation of interrelated lessons of experience bearing differing degrees of existential meaning. Understanding thus stands for an interested mind poised to interpret and respond fruitfully to unfolding experience in pursuit of satisfactory and avoidance of negative existential meaning.

7. Conclusion

Polanyi’s prioritizing of understanding leads the way to a new phase of epistemology. To be sure, much consciousness is a fumbling stream of bits and pieces that leads to no coherent outcome. Then understanding plays little or no role in consciousness. Yet I have sought to demonstrate, in agreement with Polanyi, that understanding is more basic for comprehending human behavior than knowledge and reason. Understanding is grounded in human purposefulness. It organizes and expresses drives and interests in largely tacit intentionality. Intended meaning evokes the imagination and language to make that tacit intention explicit, available for assessment and further development. Explicit meaning is open to evaluation as to its existential meaning, its felt significance. And that felt significance functions as feedback influencing the nature and scope of our understood interests. It thereby shapes further intentionality. Identified meaning, intended meaning, expressed meaning, significant meaning—such are stages in the systemic loop fueling the advance of understanding. Understanding is both source and goal.

The way I have recast Polanyi’s notion of existential meaning helps illuminate Polanyi’s two most deeply felt philosophical purposes. The first is to rectify the thinking that led to the twentieth century’s great disasters. The second is to move beyond nihilism by describing and supporting the various ways humans can create and enjoy meaningful lives. The latter is the goal of the final book to which Polanyi contributed: Meaning (see M 44-45, 107, 216). With respect to each of Polanyi’s purposes, erroneous use of thought and language created international social catastrophes that he sought to overcome. Distorted, antisocial ways of experiencing existential meaning

61 Catherine Elgin is a contemporary philosopher who, like Polanyi, persuasively argues for the priority of understanding over knowledge. See her True Enough (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017).
share responsibility for the nihilism, moral inversion, and disrespect of tradition that contributed to massive individual and social suffering. The enflamed rhetoric of Aryan superiority unleashed savage sorts of satisfaction within Nazism. The Marxist suspicion of ethical restraint as serving bourgeois interests helped legitimate Communist duplicity, tyranny, and terror. Within the Western world, the glorification of scientific objectivity devalued religion, ethics, and other humanistic views as merely subjective and arbitrary, thus encouraging nihilism while undermining the various humanistic ways of living rich, meaningful lives.

The lesson of all this begins with the recognition that language can be shaped into frameworks that promote terrible, immoral outcomes. When ideas assume power within society that undermine religious and other traditions supporting ultimate values like truth and justice, existential meaning can be misdirected, and disaster can ensue. Within such demonic frameworks, people can still experience existential meaning, even though they are supportive of catastrophic ends. The Nazi can experience satisfaction at killing those considered to be inferior. To support good world order, existential meaning must be situated within cultures constrained by what Polanyi calls the firmament of values. The basic aim of Polanyi’s philosophy can be seen as ethical in the broad sense. He seeks to rectify language and properly align existential meaning with positive social goals. This requires both understanding of the dangers of wrong thought and recognition of the possibility of experiencing lives charged with positive existential meaning. It is the nature of human interpretation that knowledge of such ultimate issues cannot be demonstrated and secured. However, understanding of how social disasters can be avoided and how lives can flourish can be achieved and secured through committed belief. This is one of the leading reasons I find it profitable to term his overarching vision a philosophy of understanding.